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Steven Umbrello
Combinatory and Complementary Practices of Values and 
Virtues in Design: A Reply to Reijers and Gordijn
AbstrAct: The purpose of this paper is to review and critique Wessel Reijers and Bert 
Gordijn’s paper moving from value sensitive design to virtuous practice design. In 
doing so, it draws on recent literature on developing value sensitive design (VSD) 
to show how the authors’ virtuous practice design (VPD), at minimum, is not mu-
tually exclusive to VSD. This paper argues that virtuous practice is not exclusive 
to the basic methodological underpinnings of VSD. This can therefore strengthen, 
rather than exclude the VSD approach. Likewise, this paper presents not only a 
critique of what was offered as a “potentially fruitful alternative to VSD” but fur-
ther clarifies and contributes to the VSD scholarship in extending its potential 
methodological practices and scope. It is concluded that VPD does not appear to 
offer any original contribution that more recent instantiations of VSD have not 
already proposed and implemented.
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1. Introduction
Developed in the early 1990’s by Batya Friedman at the University of Washing-
ton, value sensitive design (VSD) has since become one of the most discussed meth-
odological approaches to responsible innovation (RI) with regards to technology 
design1. Birthed within the human-computer interaction domain, VSD has spread 
its tendrils into other technological domains such as robotics2, nanotechnology3, 
1 B. Friedman, D. G. Hendry, Value Sensitive Design. Shaping Technology with Moral Imagi-
nation, Cambridge (MA), MIT Press, 2019.
2 A. van Wynsberghe, Designing Robots for Care. Care Centered Value-Sensitive Design, in 
“Science and Engineering Ethics”, XIX (2013), no. 2, pp. 407-33, https://doi.org/10.1007/
s11948-011-9343-6.
3 J. Timmermans, Y. Zhao, J. van den Hoven, Ethics and Nanopharmacy. Value Sensitive 
Design of New Drugs, in “NanoEthics”, V (2011), no. 3, pp. 269-283, https://doi.org/10.1007/
s11569-011-0135-x; S. Umbrello, Atomically Precise Manufacturing and Responsible Innovation. 
A Value Sensitive Design Approach to Explorative Nanophilosophy, in “International Journal of 
Technoethics”, X (2019), no. 2, pp. 1-21, https://doi.org/10.4018/IJT.2019070101.
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energy technologies4, industrial manufacturing technologies5, as well as artificial 
intelligence6, among others, all underpinned with the aim of developing these tech-
nologies in a responsible way, predicated on the values of stakeholders. Often de-
scribed as a principled approach to technology design, VSD’s strength is that it en-
courages existing design practices regardless of domain to be seamlessly integrated 
into its tripartite methodology (see Figure 1) of conceptual investigations where the 
philosophical literature is investigate and values are defined, empirical investigations 
where social scientific methods for eliciting stakeholder values are put into practice 
and technical investigations where the technology itself is looked at as to how it can 
support or constrain those stakeholder values. In doing so, it not only allows ethics 
to be integrated into practices, but it allows practices to manifest themselves towards 
responsible innovation. Simply put, VSD is not hegemonic in its normative prescrip-
tions but allows for a dynamic design program to emerge in any given sociocultural 
context.
Figure 1. The recursive VSD tripartite framework employed in this study7.
4 A. Correljé et al., Responsible Innovation in Energy Projects. Values in the Design of Tech-
nologies, Institutions and Stakeholder Interactions, in “Responsible Innovation 2”, ed. by B.J. 
Koops et al., Springer International Publishing, 2015, pp. 183-200, https://link.springer.com/ch
apter/10.1007%2F978-3-319-17308-5_10.
5 F. Longo, A. Padovano, S. Umbrello, Value-Oriented and Ethical Technology Engineering 
in Industry 5.0. A Human-Centric Perspective for the Design of the Factory of the Future, in “Ap-
plied Sciences”, X (2020), no. 12, 4182, pp. 1-25 https://doi.org/10.3390/app10124182; L. Gaz-
zaneo, A. Padovano, S. Umbrello, Designing Smart Operator 4.0 for Human Values. A Value 
Sensitive Design Approach, in International Conference on Industry 4.0 and Smart Manufacturing 
(ISM 2019) in “Procedia Manufacturing”, XLII (2020), pp. 219-226, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
promfg.2020.02.073.
6 S. Umbrello, Beneficial Artificial Intelligence Coordination by Means of a Value Sensitive 
Design Approach, in “Big Data and Cognitive Computing”, III (2019), 3, 5, pp. 1-13, https://
doi.org/10.3390/bdcc3010005; S. Umbrello, A. F. De Bellis, A Value-Sensitive Design Approach 
to Intelligent Agents, in Artificial Intelligence Safety and Security, ed. by R. V. Yampolskiy, CRC 
Press, 2018, pp. 395-410, https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.17162.77762.
7 S. Umbrello, Meaningful Human Control over Smart Home Systems. A Value Sensitive De-
sign Approach, in “HUMANA.MENTE Journal of Philosophical Studiess”, XII (2020), no. 37, 
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In a recent article Reijers and Gordijn8 argue that the VSD approach is incomplete, 
and its ethical underpinnings insufficiently grounded in normative moral theory and 
instead depart from VSD’s heuristic toolkit in favor of a foundation built on virtue 
ethics in practice. They build their virtuous practice design (VPD) on previous cri-
tiques of VSD and its reliance on heuristics rather than a commitment to a moral 
theory(ies) for grounding its methodologies9. They argue that the current technologi-
cal mediated condition that describes human-technology relations is more aptly ac-
counted for by a heuristic of virtues rather than the heuristic of values that VSD is 
predicated on10. Although I agree with the authors that the emphasis on a heuristic of 
values at the opportunity cost of those of virtues in practice leaves a gap in grounding 
VSD practice to a certain extent, I disagree with the authors on at least two points: (1) 
that the argument they make for VPD excludes VSD and (2) the implicit assumption 
that VSD in itself excludes moral grounding because of its use of a heuristic of values.
To this end, this paper aims to show at least three things: (1) showing how VPD 
is not exclusive of VSD. To do this I will argue that Reijers and Gordijn treat VSD 
as monolithic whereas it is far more dynamic and has recently been described by its 
founders as being characterized by at least fourteen different VSD methods11, (2) 
that the moral intuitions that underly virtuous practices as described in their ap-
proach are problematic particularly with emerging technologies and stakeholder 
elicitations12, and (3) that their approach fundamentally lacks a principled and 
clear directive that designers and engineers can explicitly adopt and integrate into 
their design programs in order to responsibly innovate. 
In order to do this, this paper is organized as follows. The following section will 
steel-man the VPD approach, outlining Reijers and Gordijn’s framework and how it 
differs from VSD. Section 3 tackles the VPD approach in greater detail, critiqing it as 
well as discusses some of the critiques of earlier conceptions of VSD that the VPD ap-
proach springboards from. Section 4 aims to critique the first of the tripartite phases 
of the VPD approach, namely, narrative practices. The fifth section discusses a critique 
of their second phase and the focus on a heuristic of virtue rather than value. The sixth 
section proposes a critique of their prescriptions for technical practice and draws par-
alleles to VSD’s technical investigations. The final section concludes this paper.
pp. 40-65.
8 W. Reijers, B. Gordijn, Moving from value sensitive design to virtuous practice design, in 
“Journal of Information, Communication and Ethics in Society”, XVII (2019), no. 2, pp. 196-
209, http://doi.org/10.1108/JICES-10-2018-0080. 
9 C. A. Le Dantec, E. S. Poole, S. P. Wyche, Values As Lived Experience. Evolving Value Sensi-
tive Design in Support of Value Discovery, in Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human 
Factors in Computing Systems, CHI ’09, ACM, New York (NY), 2009, pp. 1141-1150. https://
doi.org/10.1145/1518701.1518875; N. Manders-Huits, What Values in Design? The Challenge 
of Incorporating Moral Values into Design, in “Science and Engineering Ethics”, XVII (2011), 
no. 2, pp. 271-287, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-010-9198-2.
10 W. Reijers, B.Gordijn, op. cit.
11 B. Friedman, D. G. Hendry, op. cit.
12 S. Umbrello, The Moral Psychology of Value Sensitive Design. The Methodological Issues of 
Moral Intuitions for Responsible Innovation, in “Journal of Responsible Innovation”, V (2018), 
no. 2, pp. 186-200, https://doi.org/10.1080/23299460.2018.1457401.
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2. Understanding Virtuous Practice Design
As mentioned above, Reijers and Gordijn’s development of VPD is motivated 
by what they believe to be an insufficient heuristic in design practice for RI, more 
poingniently, a heuristic of values rather than a heuristic of virtuous practice does not 
capture the “the contemporary, technologically mediated human condition”13. They 
build on the already existent works of Le Dantec et al.14 and Manders-Huits15 whom 
advanced substantial critiques against VSD’s value heuristics. From here, they adopt 
and combine two approaches to form their VPD approach: (1) a heuristic of virtue 
from Vallor16 and (2) a theory of technical practice from MacIntyre17.
In taking this approach, the authors argue that VPD shifts the focus of design 
away from artefacts and technical design requirments (as is the central concern of 
VSD) and towards design practices, policy and professional training and educa-
tion as well as the (legal) regulation of these practices. In doing so, they frame their 
VPD approach in a similarly tripartite structure like that of VSD saying that the 
three elements of VPD are:
(1) investigating narratives;
(2) reflecting on the practices captured by these narratives using a heuristic of virtues;
and
(3) prescribing aspects of relevant practices to enhance the extent to which they cul-
tivate the virtues.18
To promote their approach as potentially substitutive of VSD, they argue that 
the vapidity of the latter approach is fundamentally predicated on its lack of con-
tributing directly to normative ethics. Instead VSD is argued to contribute by in-
forming us when, who, and to what technical artifacts normative ethics can be 
applied to. They thus forward two claims that form their critique of VSD and offer 
VPD as a solution:
(1) that the notion of “value” as operationalized by VSD runs the risk of either dea-
ling with mere preferences or constituting an arbitrary heuristic; and
(2) that the exclusive focus on values embedded in the design of artefacts and systems 
leads to a narrow understanding of the potential impacts of technologies.19
13 W. Reijers, B.Gordijn, op. cit., p. 197.
14 C. A. Le Dantec, E. S. Poole, S. P. Wyche, Values As Lived Experience. Evolving Value 
Sensitive Design in Support of Value Discovery, cit.
15 N. Manders-Huits, What Values in Design? The Challenge of Incorporating Moral Values 
into Design, cit.
16 S. Vallor, Technology and the virtues. A philosophical guide for a future worth wanting, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016. 
17 A. MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, London, University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1988. 
18 W. Reijers, B. Gordijn, op. cit., p. 197.
19 Ibidem, p. 198.
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The first of the two criticisms is built on the previous critiques of the heu-
ristics of values by Le Dantec et al. and Manders-Huits. Le Dantec et al. argue 
that formulating a pre-determined list of implicated values runs the risk of 
ignoring important values that can be elicited from any given empirical case 
by mapping those value a priori. Manders-Huits instead takes on the concept 
of ‘values’ itself with VSD as the central issue. She argues that the traditional 
VSD definition of values as “what a person or group of people consider impor-
tant in life”20 is nebulous and runs the risk of conflating stakeholders prefer-
ences with moral values.
Reijers and Gordijn’s second critique of VSD argues that the VSD approach 
is fundamentally predicated on a dynamic of control, that is, control of social 
outcomes through design interventions. They draw on a foundational study of 
the VSD approach in action to illustrate how the language of design interven-
tions are explictly directed towards achieving designated social outcomes21. 
The argue that this emphasis, although important, should be accompanied 
by a broader understanding of the impacts of technologies by accounting 
for “education, training, teambuilding, laws, codes of conduct, ethical oaths, 
etc”22. This critique is extended to their criticism that VSD generally sidelines 
the technical practices of design, human development and regulation and the 
broader ethics of technology. 
They then propose VPD as an alternative to VSD arguing that it differs in at 
least the following two ways: 
(1) it offers a way to ground the heuristic of values in a normative theory (thereby 
turning to a heuristic of the virtues); and
(2) it broadens up VSD’s narrow and exclusive focus on technology design by includ-
ing technical practices in which artefacts and systems are involved.23
Towards these ends, the authors take a similar strategy to who grounded VSD 
in care ethics24, but instead aim to move forward by using virtue ethics as the axi-
ological theory grounding their approach. Similar to how ‘values’ are treated in 
VSD, VPD argues that the heuristic of virtues – they use ‘courage’ for example – is 
grounded in everyday ‘common belief’. Not only this, but each of the virtues that 
populate what is called common belief has a particular ‘philosophical anthropol-
ogy’ to trace its relations and meaning. Because of this it confronts the first of the 
two critiques of VSD because:
20 Friedman et al., Value Sensitive Design and Information Systems, in Early engagement and 
new technologies: Opening up the laboratory, ed. by N. Doorn, D. Schuurbiers, I. van de Poel, 
M. E. Gorman, Dordrecht, Springer Netherlands, 2013, p. 70.
21 Ibidem.
22W. Reijers, B. Gordijn, op. cit., p. 200.
23 Ibidem.
24 A. van Wynsberghe, op. cit.
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(1) on the one hand, the heuristic of the virtues is not arbitrary because it is supported 
by a normative theory; and
(2) on the other hand, the heuristic remains responsive to stakeholder engagement 
because the relevant virtues can be derived from the expressions of standards of ex-
cellence and life plans that relate to a certain technical practice.25
Their second argument for adopting virtue ethics as an axiology is that it centra-
lizes practice, hence framing technical practice as of human-technology interaction 
as central. In doing so, they argue that virtue ethics provides a clear and explicit 
conception of human practices, making it ideal and more comprehensive as an 
approach to technological development. In doing so, it confronts the second of the 
two critiques of VSD because:
(1) the scope of concern and intervention in VPD is significantly broadened, focusing 
on technical practices; and
(2) it includes prescriptive interventions that go beyond technology design and in-
clude considerations of human development and regulation.26
Formalizing their approach, they propose a tripartite approach that is modeled 
after VSD:
(1) Investigation of Narratives: understanding relevant practices by gathering and 
investigating narratives that recount-related standards of excellence and life plans. 
These narratives can be gathered from interactions with relevant stakeholders, which 
can be people making, using or governing a certain technology.27
(2) Reflection based on the virtues: moving from the descriptive and interpretative 
account of a practice to a normative reflection of that practice, which is based on a 
heuristic of the virtues that is developed by.28
(3) Prescriptions for technical practices: prescribing certain aspects of the technical 
practice, which could relate to aspects of the design of the technology used not only 
in the practice but also to a variety of other aspects, such as training, education and 
regulation of the practice.29
Each of the three parts are then applied to the example of military drones. This 
paper forgoes recounting their example, as their paper does so in a salient and cle-
ar way and hence the reader should refer to their account as authoritative. None-
theless, this section aimed to sum up their VPD approach, which they admit is an 
initial attempt at integrating virtue ethics within the R&I discourse. The following 
section will tangle with the critiques of VSD that Reijers and Gordijn work from as 
well as engage with the apparent strengths and weaknesses of the VPD approach. 
25W. Reijers, B.Gordijn, op. cit., p. 201.
26 Ibidem, p. 202.
27 Ibidem.
28 S. Vallor, op. cit.; W. Reijers, B. Gordijn, op. cit., p. 204.
29 Ibidem, p. 206.
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3. Critiques of VSD and VPD
To reiterate what was already mentioned in the introduction, the motivation 
behind this paper is not exclusively to provide a critique of VPD, but rather to 
show its non-exclusionary and symbiotic structure in relation to VSD. Although 
the authors, in the onset of their paper claim VPD as a potential alternative to 
VSD, they simultaneously call for VSD to account for virtues. It is not always clear 
whether or not they are offering an alternative or an augmentation of the VSD 
approach. Either way, the VPD approach has its merits, which warrants taking it 
under serious consideration, and this often means highlighting potential weaknes-
ses and blind spots in order to adjust it towards optimal robustness.
To begin, the two pronged critique of VSD that the authors work from are 
treated overly simplistically and does not take into account the literature that has 
followed those critiques, justified and reasonable as they are given the literature on 
VSD up to those dates of publications.
(1) that the notion of “value” as operationalized by VSD runs the risk of either dea-
ling with mere preferences or constituting an arbitrary heuristic; and
(2) that the exclusive focus on values embedded in the design of artefacts and systems 
leads to a narrow understanding of the potential impacts of technologies.
The issues of potentially conflating preferences with moral values is a real issue 
that presents itself within VSD theory. This is often the argument levied in support 
of adopting a moral theory as a ground for VSD. However, VSD does not a priori 
make any such commitments to any given moral theory, and that in many ways 
presents itself as its strength. VSD is and has always been proposed as a methodol-
ogy that is able to be adopted, adapted and augmented to any given socio-cultural 
context, forming itself always already around the existing practices, norms and 
institutions of design programs. What this means is that VSD is methodologically 
open to modulation of any chosen moral theory or theories. Just war theory for 
example was used by30 for the design of the user interface for missile systems, 
while care ethics, a substantially practice-oriented moral theory was adopted by 
van Wynsberghe31 in designing and weighing design options for care robots for the 
elderly, and framed as a distinctively normative. Admittedly, Reijers and Gordijn 
do admit that van Wynsberghe has pushed VSD the furthest in this regard, yet they 
criticise the approach for being particily nebulous and unclear as to exactly what 
distinguishes practices and actions within the context of care ethics rather than any 
thoughts or actions more generally. Although this may be true in van Wynsberghe’s 
presentation, the practices, institutions, regulations and norms within the social 
30 M. Cummings, Integrating ethics in design through the value-sensitive design approach, 
in “Science and Engineering Ethics”, XII (2006), no. 4, pp. 701-715, http://doi.org/10.1007/
s11948-006-0065-0. 
31 A. van Wynsberghe, Designing Robots for Care: Care Centered Value-Sensitive Design, in 
“Science and Engineering Ethics” XIX (2013), no. 2., pp. 407-433, https://doi.org/10.1007/
s11948-011-9343-6.
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contexts in which care ethics is practiced is quite delineated and regulated in the 
same way that Reijers and Gordijn argue VPD aims towards.
Likewise, the framing that the authors take of VSD often present the approach 
as being neutral in light of its persistance to not make moral commitments. As is 
true with any artefact, VSD as a tool is itself not value neutral, and can be used 
towards various moral ends. Regarding the question of universal values, that is in 
itself dubious and continually under contention within the philosophical discorse 
at large, VSD rightly does not contribute to this debate in any substantive way as 
would be seen by moral theorists. That being said, VSD does make a universal 
commitment to certain values that it does argue are universal values, those being 
human well-being, justice and dignity32. Reijers and Gordijn’s approach engages 
with a less-developed theoretical construct of VSD, primarily from the criticisms 
of the approach that have since been addressed by multiple scholars and led to 
evolutions of how VSD is understood and its more recent empahsis on practice33, 
institutions and regulation34, as well as the socio-structural aspects of design con-
texts35. These universal values are considered through the more recently effectu-
ated commitments that the founders of VSD have laid out:
(1) to define human values by what is important in their lives, with a focus on ethics 
and morality
(2) to consider and legitimate both direct and indirect stakeholders
(3) to represent and address value tensions by appropriate means, and;
(4) to consider the co-evolution of technology and socio-cultural; aspects of the de-
sign situation.36
Reijers and Gordijn make a similar critique of the approach taken by37 approach 
of grounding VSD’s value heuristic saying:
[van de Poel] offers another way to ground VSD’s value heuristic, namely by offering 
a “value hierarchy”, consisting of moral values, norms and specific design require-
ments. In this hierarchy, a moral value such as democracy could lead to the norm “1 
32 B. Friedman, D. G. Hendry, op. cit., p. 173.
33 J. van den Hoven. I. van de Poel, Engineering Design Practice, in Value Sensitive Design: 
Shaping Technology with Moral Imagination, ed. by B. Friedman, D. G. Hendry, Boston (MA), 
MIT Press, 2019, pp. 157-162.
34 S. Umbrello, Conceptualizing Policy in Value Sensitive Design: A Machine Ethics Approach, 
in Machine Law, Ethics, and Morality in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, ed. by S. Thompson, 
Hershey (PA), IGI Global, 2021, Ch. 7.
35 L. P. Nathan, Envisioning Criteria, in Value Sensitive Design. Shaping Technology with 
Moral Imagination, ed. B. Friedman, D. G. Hendry, Boston (MA), MIT Press, 2019, pp. 162-
164; S. Umbrello, Imaginative Value Sensitive Design. Using Moral Imagination Theory to Inform 
Responsible Technology Design, in “Science and Engineering Ethics”, XXVI (2020), no. 2, pp. 
575-595, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-019-00104-4.
36 B. Friedman, D. G. Hendry, op. cit., p. 173.
37 I. van de Poel, Translating Values into Design Requirements, in Philosophy and Enginee-
ring: Reflections on Practice, Principles and Process, ed. by D. P. Michelfelder, N. McCarthy, D. 
E. Goldberg, Dordrecht, Springer Netherlands, 2013, pp. 253-266. 
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man 1 vote” and the related design requirement “one voting pass for each voter”. 
Moral values are considered as values for the sake of which norms are implemented 
and design requirements are followed. Nevertheless, the problem with Van de Poel’s 
value hierarchy is that it does not account for reasons why norms are followed. For 
instance, in the abovementioned example, his framework does not explain why de-
mocracy is a value of moral importance that ought to be followed. The only reason for 
it to be posited appears to be that stakeholders prefer democracy as a value.38
Although an interesting critique, it does not appear valid. Van de Poel39 at sev-
eral points highlights the importance of taking reasons into account (i.e., p. 260, 
261, 263). Also the point that “his framework does not explain why democracy 
is a value of moral importance that ought to be followed” is already almost liter-
ally addressed in the original paper (see page 261). Although it is true that van 
de Poel does not propose a substantive normative theory, he does stress that the 
issues mentioned by Reijers and Gordijn should be taken into account rather than 
just relying on what stakeholders find important. Still, Reijers and Gordijn do not 
necessary forward a direct critique of van de Poel’s value hierarchy as they claim, 
given that van de Poel’s framework is substantively methdological in its approach. 
At best, Reijers and Gordijn’s speaks past that van de Poel’s methodological ap-
proach through the framing of normative moral theory. 
To this end, the two critiques that form Reijers and Gordijn’s motivation for 
proposing VPD seems to be based on some fundamental mischaracterizations of 
contemporary VSD, propogated from earlier critiques of VSD that have since been 
tangled with, most saliently VSD’s overt empahsis on the practices of designers, 
institutional and regulatory vectors as well as the situatedness of design practices 
in sociocultural contexts that influence those other vectors. For VPD to be a suffi-
ciently viable alternative to VSD, as the authors propose, it has to face these issues 
headon and demonstrate its preferability, particularly given the increasing atten-
tion that VSD has attracted in recent years40. Still, these issues does not leave VPD 
vacuous, there are admirable components that VPD proposes that are aligned with 
VSD principles and would, if adopted as part of the general framework, stregn-
then VSD practices in general.
4. Moral Narrativity and Narrative as Method
Reijers and Gordijn are explicit the the intelligibility of understanding practices 
in design contexts are made manesft viz. narrative. The authors predict this on 
analysis that practioners rationalize their practice through narrative modes that are 
38 W. Reijers, B.Gordijn, op. cit., p. 201.
39 I. van de Poel, op. cit.
40 T. Winkler, S. Spiekermann, Twenty Years of Value Sensitive Design. A Review of Method-
ological Practices in VSD Projects, in “Ethics and Information Technology”, (2018), https://doi.
org/10.1007/s10676-018-9476-2.
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fundamentality embedded in a moral tradition41. The first of the tripartite meth-
odology that they propose is investigating narratives. Their example of the military 
drone employs the tool of narrative interviews to elicit narratives from stakehold-
ers to understand practices in context and permit more salient design. This is a 
particuarly potent approach to design given that moral development and expres-
sion are fundamentally predicted on narrative modalities42. That being said, the 
difficulty that presents itself here is plural (1) it is contestable that such a proposi-
tion is original to VPD and (2) that narrative as a fundamental tool in stakeholder 
elicitation is already present as a viable VSD method.
The authors argue that in investigating narratives: 
multiple distinct practices can be identified in relation to this particular technology: 
the practices of designing, producing and marketing the technology, of operating 
and maintaining the technology, and of regulating, monitoring and protesting against 
the technology. Each of these practices will have its particular standards of excel-
lence that link to particular life plans, and will point at a distinct type or group of 
stakeholder(s).43
Umbrello44 already argues for the inextricable role of narrative as moral practice 
by stakeholders in direct contribution to VSD whereas various other existent VSD 
empirical methods make use of stakeholder narratives, implicitly or explicitly, as a 
means of stakeholder identification, elicitation, and value discovery in a functionally 
similar manner to that of VPD narrative investigations. Stakeholder tokens used for 
identifying stakeholders, understanding their relationships and interactions as well 
as distinguishing peripheral from core stakeholders is a proven method45. More ex-
plicitly, value scenarios use narratives, “comprising stories of use, intended to surface 
human and technical aspects of technology and context”46 has been widely used in 
VSD applications and conceptualizations as a means of understanding stakeholder 
implications, their relations to key values and the wide-spread and long-term use and 
impact that Reijers and Gordijn explictly argue to be lacking from VSD47. Along-
41 A. MacIntyre, op. cit. 
42 M. C. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philoso-
phy, 2nd ed., Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press, 2001, http://www.cambridge.org/
gb/academic/subjects/philosophy/ethics/fragility-goodness-luck-and-ethics-greek-tragedy-and-
philosophy-2nd-edition#ZSWphmvlMH11Ollq.99.
43 W. Reijers, B.Gordijn, op. cit., pp. 203-204.
44 S. Umbrello, The Moral Psychology of Value Sensitive Desig. The Methodological Issues of 
Moral Intuitions for Responsible Innovation, cit.; S. Umbrello, Imaginative Value Sensitive De-
sign. Using Moral Imagination Theory to Inform Responsible Technology Design, cit. 
45 D. Yoo, Stakeholder Tokens. A Constructive Method for Value Sensitive Design Stakeholder 
Analysis, in “Ethics and Information Technology”, (2018), pp. 1-5.
46 B. Friedman, D. G. Hendry, op. cit., p. 61.
47 See A. Czeskis et al., Parenting from the pocket: Value tensions and technical directions for 
secure and private parent-teen mobile safety, in “Proceedings of the Sixth Symposium on Usable 
Privacy and Security”, (2010), pp. 1-15; L. P. Nathan et al., Value Scenarios. A Technique for 
Envisioning Systemic Effects of New Technologies, in “CHI ‘07 Extended Abstracts on Human 
Factors in Computing Systems” (2007), pp. 2585-2590; J. Woelfer et al., Improving the Safety of 
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side these tools, value sketches48, value-oriented semi-structured interviews49, ethno-
graphically informed inquiry on values and technology50 as well as multi-lifespan co-
design51 and Envinsioning Cards52 are some methods among others that are central 
to VSD empirical investigations, each of which have narrative elements and tools 
central to their function. 
5. A Heuristic of Virtue
In their second investigation in the application of VPD, Reijers and Gordijn 
provide the normative grounding for the practices described and intereted in the 
preceeding investigation. Given that in the previous section it was shown how 
the role of narrative is neither comparatively unique nor exclusive to VPD, this 
particular normative grounding can methodologically be applied to the narrative 
practices outlined by any one of the given method(s) outlined above. The heuristic 
of virtues that they adopt from Vallor53, although not fully spelled out, is partially 
used in terms of three virtues: perspective, empathy and justice. The authors de-
scribe them as follows:
– Perspective: Related to the need for a better understanding of the impacts of emer-
ging technologies.
– Empathy: Related to the need to deal with the influence of digital culture on our 
interpersonal relations.
– Justice: Related to the need to address the increasing unjust distribution of resourc-
es and power through technological communication channels.54
Homeless Young People with Mobile Phones. Values, Form and Function, in “Proceedings of the 
SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems”, (2011), pp. 1707-1716; D. Yoo 
et al., A value sensitive action-reflection model. evolving a co-design space with stakeholder and 
designer prompts, in “Proceedings of the SIGCHI conference on human factors in computing 
systems”, (2013), pp. 419-428. 
48 B. Friedman, P. H. Kahn Jr, Human Values, Ethics, and Design, in The Human-Computer 
Interaction Handbook, Boca Raton, CRC Press, (2007), 1209-1233. 
49 A. Borning et al., Informing Public Deliberation. Value Sensitive Design of Indicators for a 
Large-Scale Urban Simulation, in “ECSCW 2005: Proceedings of the Ninth European Confer-
ence on Computer-Supported Cooperative Work”, Springer, (2005), pp. 449-468.
50 L. P. Nathan, Sustainable Information Practice. An Ethnographic Investigation, “Journal 
of the American Society for Information Science and Technology”, LX111 (2012), no. 11, 
pp. 2254-2268.
51 D. Yoo et al., Multi-Lifespan Design Thinking. Two Methods and a Case Study with the 
Rwandan Diaspora, in “Proceedings of the 2016 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Com-
puting Systems”, ACM, 2016, pp. 4423-4434.
52 B. Friedman et al., Envisioning Cards, University of Washington, Value Sensitive Design 
Research Lab, 2017, http://envisioningcards.com.
53 S. Vallor, op. cit.
54 W. Reijers, B. Gordijn, op. cit., p. 203-204.
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Although perspective, empathy and justice are undoubtebly virtues, particularly 
within an axiology of virtue ethics, they are not exclusive to it, and not compara-
tively unique from VSD which is explicit in its dedication to all three, among oth-
ers, and not exclusvely framed as ‘values’ per se as Reijers and Gordijn may be 
wont to contend. Begining with perspective, as directed towards understanding 
the impacts of technologies, VSD makes a similar methodological commitment 
through its pluraility of empirical methods. More saliently, Envisioning Cards are 
one such method that is built on four critera – stakeholders, time, values, and per-
vasiveness – that are used from “ideation, co-design, heuristic critique, evaluation, 
and other purposes”55. Here the time criterion is most equivocal to the function of 
the perspective virtue of VPD in that time cards are:
inspired by the long-term perspective of urban planning, the Time criterion helps 
guide designers to consider the longer term implications of their work – implications 
that will only emerge after the technology has moved through initial phases of novelty 
to later phases of appropriation and integration into society.56
To this end, the Envisioning Cards are designed to help designers tease out the 
long-term ethical implications of their work. Both justice and empathy are also 
considered in the Envisioning Cards set (in the Values criterion) however they are 
also central to VSD as a principled approach to technology design. As mentioned, 
more recent conceptions of VSD address the older critiques of VSD on which 
VPD is built by making the moral commitment to at least three universal values, 
those being a tendency towards design that emphasizes human wellbeing, justice 
and dignity57. The Envisioning Cards coupled with other methods like multi-
lifespan timelines and multi-lifespan co-design make prescient the more specific 
understandings of empathy and justice as Reijers and Gordijn describe above in 
relation to military drones58.
The potential boons of applying a virtue like perspective to any given stkaeholder 
narrative is undeniable, given that by doing so it can actually augment value repre-
sentation and analysis. However, by a similar token, the framing of such an applica-
tion through virtue ethics has the potential to stifle non-axiological understandings 
of any given narrative even within its moral tradition as a result of value dynamism 
over time and excaberbated by the cognitive biases that are similarly exacerbated 
when considering transformative technologies59. The ample de-biasing heuristics al-
55 B. Friedman, D. G. Hendry, op. cit., p. 85.
56 B. Friedman et al., The Envisioning Criteria. Envisioning Cards, available at: https://www.
envisioningcards.com/?page_id=2#5 (accessed June 16, 2020).
57B. Friedman, D. G. Hendry, op. cit., p. 173.
58 B. Friedman et al., op. cit.
59 L. Caviola et al., Cognitive biases can affect moral intuitions about cognitive enhancement, in 
“Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience”, XVIII (2014), pp. 1-5; M. Ćirković, Small Theories and Large 
Risks – Is Risk Analysis Revevant for Epistemology?, in “Risk Analysis”, XXXII (2011), no. 11, pp. 
1-17; S. Umbrello, Imaginative Value Sensitive Design: How Moral Imagination Exceeds Moral Law 
Theories in Informing Responsible Innovation, Edinburgh, University of Endinburgh, 2018.
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ready present in VSD methodology makes avoiding such pitfalls easier by clarifying 
them methdologically, something that is not clear in VPD, although that does not 
necessarily entail that such is not possible within the VPD framework.
6. Technical Investigations and Technical Practice
The final phase of the VPD tripartite methodology is making prescriptions for 
technical practice. They outline this phase as the one that:
looks at a practice in its entirety and not only at the technical design but also of a par-
ticular technology. As such, this stage is concerned with prescribing certain aspects of 
the technical practice, which could relate to aspects of the design of the technology 
used not only in the practice but also to a variety of other aspects, such as training, 
education and regulation of the practice. We can categorise these different types of 
prescriptions according to human development, design and regulation.60
Here Reijers and Gordijn provide what would be akin to providing ‘design requir-
ments’ and analyzing technical investigations in VSD. However, their analysis is bur-
dened by some obscurity as to exactly how to proceed in a practical way. Although 
they do make some discrete suggestions in the case of drones such as “the creation 
of mobile control centres that would operate in vehicles deployed within the zones 
of combat”61, they fail to provide the more specific directions that are needed by de-
signers who would consider adopting VPD. In essence, Reijers and Gordijn provide 
very general suggestions as to the ‘prescriptions for technical practice’ without more 
explicitly demonstrating the potential efficacy of VPD. Similarly, in their prescrip-
tions for technical practice with regards to regulation, they ambiguously suggest:
a regulatory framework could accommodate conscientious objection to a certain as-
pect of the operation or to the practice of drone operation in its entirety. In practical 
terms, this means that pilots of military drones should have the legal option to object 
to certain orders, provided that they have to take responsibility for such objections 
and justify them in court. For such a practice of justification, particular standards of 
excellence could be established (e.g. a pilot could be expected to provide reasons 
that are not arbitrary but related to a conception of justice that can be supported 
by circumstantial evidence – such as the absence of sufficiently clear information to 
distinguish civilian from military targets).62
Although their analysis follows from the premises of their axiology, it fails to 
provide any real ways for this to actually be undertaken by engineers and leave the 
burden of more specific design questions regarding requirements and specifica-
tions up to the engineers to discover and implement. In doing so, it leaves a lot left 
60 W. Reijers, B. Gordijn, op. cit., p. 205-206.
61 Ibidem, p. 206.
62 Ibidem.
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wanting with regards to incentives for adoption, particularly when put up against 
the more established VSD approach which does provide technical design require-
ments that make the translation of value tangible for the designer.
7. Conclusions
Virtuous Practice Design is an approach that builds on the philosophical cri-
tique that VSD requires moral commitments and a moral axiology in order to more 
saliently design sociotechnical systems. Similarly, Reijers and Gordijn argue that 
VSD’s emphasis on the technical design of artefacts comes at the opportunity cost 
of avoiding the long-term impacts of technologies on societies. What I have tried 
to show here is that there are some fatal flaws in the foundations motivating the 
VPD approach as well as some mischaracterizations of VSD which fundamentally 
hurt the merits that are potentially fruitful in VPD.
The now decade long critique that VSD does not have a moral foundation or 
axiology, although true in the sense that it does not adhere to any given discrete 
moral law theory, it does nonetheless make a commiment to at least three moral 
values that it argues to be universal, albiet expressed in varied ways as a result of 
sociocultural distinctions. Likewise, much of the boons that VPD proposes such 
as a focus on narrative, practices, regulations and eduction – that the authors argue 
to be lacking in VSD – are not only present in VSD, but fundamentally predicate 
the VSD approach. Imaginative VSD63, Envisioning Cards64, value sketches and 
scenarios65 as well as multi-lifespan co-design66 are all examples of established VSD 
methods that are grounded on an empahsis on stakeholder narratives, practices, 
regulation, education and the long-term impacts of sociotechnical systems.
Although VPD may prove to provide salient design results if adopted by 
design teams, its proponents need to show how and what exactly it offers to 
the growing body of literature on responsible innovation that VSD currently 
does not. As it stands, its presentation is based on a since addressed method-
ological issue in VSD and some mischaracterizations of the internal pluraity 
of methodological tools available at VSD’s disposal. VPD in the future may 
prove to be a useful method used within VSD, and perhaps, if expounded in 
significant detail and demonstrating its originality, offer itself as a reasonable 
alternative to VSD. However, as it has currently been proposed, VPD does not 
do those things.
63 S. Umbrello, Imaginative Value Sensitive Design. Using Moral Imagination Theory to In-
form Responsible Technology Design, cit.
64 B. Friedman et al., Envisioning Cards, op. cit.
65 B. Friedman, D. G. Hendry, A. Borning, A Survey of Value Sensitive Design Methods, 
in “Foundations and Trends in Human-Computer Interaction”, XI (2017), no. 2, pp. 63-125, 
https://doi.org/10.1561/1100000015.
66 B. Friedman, L. P. Nathan, D. Yoo, Multi-Lifespan Information System Design in Support 
of Transitional Justice. Evolving Situated Design Principles for the Long(er) Term, in “Interacting 
with Computers”, XXIX (2017), no. 1, pp. 80-96. https://doi.org/10.1093/iwc/iwv045. 
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